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Abstract
Background—Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (HPAI) viruses found in poultry and wild 
birds occasionally infect humans and can cause serious disease. In 2014, the Advisory Committee 
on Immunization Practices (ACIP) reviewed data from one licensed ASO3-adjuvanted influenza 
A(H5N1) vaccine for consideration of use during inter-pandemic periods among persons with 
occupational exposure. To guide vaccine policy decisions, we conducted a survey of laboratory 
workers to assess demand for HPAI vaccination.
Methods—We designed an anonymous web survey (EpiInfo 7.0) to collect information on 
demographics, type of work and time spent with HPAI viruses, and interest in HPAI vaccination. 
Eligible participants were identified from 42 entities registered with United States Department of 
Agriculture’s Agricultural Select Agent program in 2016 and emailed electronic surveys. 
Personnel with Biosafety Level 3 enhanced (BSL-3E) laboratory access were surveyed. 
Descriptive analysis was performed.
Results—Overall, 131 responses were received from 33 principal investigators, 26 research 
scientists, 24 technicians, 15 postdoctoral fellows, 6 students, and 27 others. The estimated 
response rate was 15% among the laboratory personnel of responding principal investigators. One 
hundred respondents reported working in a BSL-3E area where HPAI experiments occurred with a 
mean time of 5.1–11.7 h per week. Overall, 49% were interested in receiving an A(H5N1) vaccine. 
By role, interest was highest among students (80%) and among those who spent >50% of their 
time in a BSL-3E area (64%). Most (61%) of those who said they might be or were not interested 
in vaccine believed it would not provide additional protection to current safety practices.
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Conclusions—Half of responding laboratory workers was interested in receiving an influenza 
A(H5N1) vaccine. HPAI vaccination of laboratory workers at risk of occupational exposure could 
be used along with existing safety practices to protect this population.
Keywords
Influenza; Human; Influenza A virus; A(H5N1) subtype; Influenza vaccines; Vaccination; 
Research personnel; Occupational Exposure/prevention & control
1. Introduction
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses, including influenza A(H5N1) viruses, 
cause severe respiratory disease and death in birds and have been found in poultry and wild 
birds in Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, and North America [1]. A(H5N1) viruses can also 
cause severe disease in humans. From 2003 through 2016, 16 countries reported 856 human 
infections of A (H5N1) virus, with 452 deaths (53% case fatality proportion), to the World 
Health Organization (WHO) [2]. Most human infections with A(H5N1) virus occur from 
contact with infected birds or environments, but limited human-to-human transmission has 
been reported [3–6].
A(H5N1) viruses are considered to have moderate pandemic potential, and research to 
understand transmission and adaptability, and to develop vaccines, are public health 
priorities [7–10]. Laboratory work with A(H5N1) viruses is necessary to further our 
understanding of these viruses and the risk they pose to public health, and to develop 
vaccines. While best practices for working with HPAI viruses protect individuals from 
exposure, including enhanced BSL3 practices, some risk of inadvertent exposure exists [11–
13]. In 2014, there were 173 principal investigators in the United States registered through 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Select Agent Program to work with 
HPAI viruses [personnel communication, Mark Hemphill]. Between 2007 and 2013, 
registered HPAI Select Agent laboratories reported a total of 44 incidents to the USDA, 
including needle sticks, animal bites, personal protective equipment failure, inadvertent 
leakage or spillage of materials, or work outside of containment areas [personnel 
communication, Mark Hemphill]. However, there has never been a laboratory-associated 
infection with an HPAI virus.
Vaccination is the primary method of preventing seasonal influenza and an important tool to 
prevent pandemic influenza [14]. In recent years, substantial research has been conducted on 
A(H5N1) vaccines, resulting in the development of licensed vaccine products for use during 
future pandemics and for pandemic stockpiles [7]. In 2013, the WHO Strategic Advisory 
Group of Experts (SAGE) Working Group on Influenza Vaccines and Immunizations 
updated their general recommendations on A(H5N1) vaccines to include use before 
pandemics (i.e., inter-pandemic) and strongly recommended vaccination of laboratory 
personnel working with A (H5N1) viruses [7]. In 2013, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention Division of Select Agents and Toxins made specific recommendations for 
vaccination with an A(H5N1) vaccine for all laboratory workers working with influenza 
viruses containing hemagglutinin from the influenza A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage [13]. 
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However, without a licensed, available vaccine for use during the inter-pandemic period, 
access to A(H5N1) vaccine among laboratory personnel in the United States has been 
limited to participation in clinical trials.
A(H5N1) vaccines are not commercially produced in the United States, but the U.S. 
government supported limited production for testing and for pandemic stockpiles [15,16]. 
There are currently doses of four A(H5N1) monovalent vaccines in the U.S. stockpile. The 
U.S. Federal Drug Administration (FDA) licensed two of these for use in the United States 
during a pandemic [17]. FDA licensed Q-Pan H5N1 in 2013 for use in persons aged ≥18 
years at increased risk of occupational exposure to influenza A(H5N1) virus. The vaccine 
contains antigen from the influenza A/Indonesia/05/2005 virus strain (Clade 2.1.3.2) and is 
intended to be administered with an oil-in-water emulsion adjuvant, AS03. The vaccine was 
prepared under contract with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services as part of 
the national pandemic preparedness initiative. The U.S. Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices (ACIP) recently considered the use of a small amount (<3000 doses) 
of stockpiled Q-Pan H5N1 vaccine for persons with occupational exposure to HPAI virus 
(e.g., laboratory workers) during the inter-pandemic period [18].
To assess the demand for an A(H5N1) vaccine among laboratory personnel working with 
HPAI viruses, we conducted a survey to help guide decisions as to whether the stockpiled 
vaccine should be made available for persons at risk of occupational exposure during the 
inter-pandemic period. The primary objective was to quantify the demand for Q-Pan H5N1 
vaccine among persons working in laboratories registered with the USDA to work with 
HPAI viruses. Secondary objectives were to describe and categorize the type and amount of 
work with HPAI viruses among laboratory workers, quantify the average weekly person-
hours of work with various HPAI viruses, and identify access to an occupational health 
clinic through which a vaccine could be administered.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Survey participants and study period
HPAI viruses are designated as Select Agents in the United States, and therefore any entity 
working with HPAI in the United States must register with the USDA Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service, Agriculture Select Agent Services. USDA identified 42 entities 
registered to work with HPAI in 2016, and sent an email containing information and a link to 
the electronic survey to all Responsible Officials and Alternate Responsible Officials at each 
of the identified entities. Each entity was requested to share the survey with principal 
investigators (PIs) working with HPAI viruses and all laboratory workers with access to their 
biosafety level 3 enhanced (BSL-3E) laboratory in which work with HPAI viruses are 
carried out. No identifying information was collected from respondents. CDC had no direct 
contact with respondents or institutions. The survey period was from August to September 
2016. The survey and report were determined not to constitute human subjects research, but 
rather public health response.
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2.2. Survey design and distribution
A web survey was created using Epi Info 7.0. The survey contained 21 questions pertaining 
to demographic characteristics, type of work with HPAI viruses, weekly person-hours of 
work with HPAI viruses, interest in HPAI and A(H5N1) vaccines, and access to vaccination 
through occupational health clinics. Additional information about Q-Pan H5N1 was not 
provided in the survey. PIs were asked to complete the self-administered electronic 
questionnaire accessed through a secure link, and to forward the secure link to all staff in 
their laboratory with access to a BSL-3E laboratory area where HPAI experiments occur. PIs 
were asked to request that all such staff complete the survey. PIs were also asked to report 
the number of persons in their laboratory with access to the BSL-3E laboratory in order to 
obtain the number of persons who would have received the survey. A reminder email was 
sent to all Responsible Officials and Alternate Responsible Officials at each of the identified 
institutions 2 weeks after the initial email.
2.3. Statistical analysis
Descriptive analysis of survey responses was performed using SAS 9.3. To estimate a 
response rate among PIs, we used a denominator of 173, the number of PIs registered in 
2014 (database limitations prevented estimation of this number in later years). We estimated 
the response rate by occupational category using the numbers provided by each PI. Analysis 
was limited to those respondents who reported working in the BSL-3E area where HPAI 
experiments occur (and therefore could have been exposed to live virus or virus particles) 
with sub-analyses limited to those who worked directly with A(H5N1) viruses. Given that 
laboratory personnel may have varying work schedules in the BSL-3E area depending on 
occupational category and work (e.g., concentrated intermittent vs. regularly scheduled 
weekly hours), we asked respondents to estimate percentages of their total work time spent 
on various types of work with HPAI or A(H5N1) (<10%, 10–25%, 26–50%, 51–75% or 
>75%). To calculate the average time spent on each type of work with HPAI viruses, we 
multiplied the lower (1% for <10%, 10% for 10–25%, 26% for 26–50%, 51% for 51–75%, 
and 76% for >75%) and upper range (9% for <10%, 25% for 10–25%, 50% for 26–50%, 75 
for 51–75% and 100% for >75%) of time spent performing each type of activity by either 40 
h per week (if the respondent indicated that they were full-time staff), or 20 h per week (for 
part-time staff/employees). The means of the lower percentage and upper percentage were 
calculated across occupational categories to give a mean range of hours per week.
3. Results
3.1. Response rate
We received 131 responses, including 33 who self-identified as PIs (33 of 173 registered 
with USDA, 19% response rate) (Fig. 1). The 33 PIs reported a combined 126 research 
scientists, 70 postdoctoral fellows, 230 research technicians, 33 students, 86 animal care 
workers, and 102 other staff with access to their BSL-3E laboratories where HPAI 
experiments occurred. The overall response rate among laboratory workers of responding 
PIs was 98 of 647 possible respondents (15%). The response rate varied by occupational 
category (Fig. 1). We received responses from 26 research scientists (26/126, 21%), 15 post-
doctoral fellows (15/70, 21%), 24 research technicians (24/230, 10%), 6 students (6/33, 
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18%), 1 animal care worker (1/86, 1.2%) and 26 from other roles, such as bio-safety 
program staff and laboratory management (26/102, 25%).
3.2. Demographics
All further analysis was limited to the 100 respondents who reported working in the BSL-3E 
area where HPAI experiments occur (Fig. 1). This included 26 PIs, 21 research scientists, 10 
post-doctoral fellows, 20 research technicians, 6 students, 1 animal care workers, and 16 
other workers. Half of respondents were female and 63% were between 25 and 44 years of 
age (Table 1). The majority of respondents worked at universities (49%) or federal 
government institutions (34%). Respondents reported a median of 8 years working in a 
BSL-3E laboratory and 6 years specifically working on HPAI viruses.
3.3. Work type and time
Respondents reported a mean of 5.1–11.7 h per week in the BSL-3E laboratory. Seventy-
eight (78%) reported working directly with either HPAI viruses or specimens from suspected 
HPAI cases, or animals infected or inoculated with HPAI viruses. The most common HPAI 
viruses with which respondents worked were A(H5N1) (65%), A(H5N2) (26%), A(H5N8) 
(21%) and A(H7N7) (21%).
Sixty-six respondents (66%) reported working with live HPAI virus (e.g., in cell culture) for 
an average of 4.2–9.3 h per week. The occupational category of research scientists reported 
the greatest amount of time spent working with live HPAI virus (mean of 8.9–15.3 h per 
week) (Table 2a). Thirty (30%) reported working with clinical samples from suspected cases 
(human or animal) of HPAI virus infection, and the average amount of time was 7.9–14.1 h 
per week. Students reported the greatest amount of time spent working with samples from 
suspected cases (15.4–25.0 h per week). Sixty-one (61%) reported working with 
experimentally inoculated or infected animals or their secretions, and the average amount of 
time was 4.1–9.4 h per week. Students reported the greatest amount of time spent working 
with HPAI-inoculated or -infected animals (7.2–15.0 h per week).
Sixty-five respondents (65%) reported working with A(H5N1) viruses. The most common 
A(H5N1) virus strains reported were A/Vietnam/1203/2004 (83%), A/Anhui/1/2005 (42%), 
and A/Indone-sia/05/2005 (37%). Fifty-nine (59%) reported working with live A (H5N1) 
virus, with a mean time of 3.5–8.4 h per week. Research scientists reported the greatest 
amount of time spent working with live A(H5N1) virus (mean of 7.4–13.9 h per week) 
(Table 2b). Twenty-one (21%) reported working with samples from suspected A(H5N1) 
human or animal cases and the average amount of time was 5.4–10.9 h per week. The 
occupational category of other workers reported the greatest amount of time spent working 
with A (H5N1) virus from suspected cases (10.4–20.0 h per week). Fifty (50%) reported 
working with animals infected or inoculated with A(H5N1) and the average amount of time 
was 3.6–8.6 h per week. Students reported the greatest amount of time spent working with 
A(H5N1) inoculated or infected animals (10.4–20.0 h per week).
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3.4. Interest in vaccines
Of the 100 respondents who reported working in a BSL-3E area where HPAI experiments 
occurred, 88 of 90 respondents (98%) reported receiving a 2015–16 seasonal influenza 
vaccine and 12 of 93 respondents (13%) had participated in a vaccine trial for an influenza 
vaccine (either seasonal or pandemic). Forty of 92 respondents (43%) had heard of the Q-
Pan H5N1 vaccine prior to the survey. When asked if they would be interested in receiving 
Q-Pan H5N1 vaccine if offered at their institution, 45 of 91 respondents (49%) said “Yes,” 
35 (38%) said they “Might be interested but needed more information,” and 11 (12%) said 
“No.” Interest in receiving Q-Pan H5N1 varied by occupational category and was highest 
among students (80%) and lowest among PIs (42%), post-docs (40%) and other workers 
(33%) (Fig. 2). Interest in receiving the vaccine also varied with the amount of reported time 
spent working in the BSL-3E laboratory (Fig. 3). Interest was highest among those who 
spent >50% of their time in a BSL-3E laboratory (64%) and lowest in those who spent 
<10% of their time in the BSL-3E laboratory (39%). Interest in Q-Pan H5N1 vaccine was 
similar by type of work performed with HPAI viruses (e.g. work with live virus, suspect 
cases, or infected or inoculated animals). Of those who had participated in an influenza 
vaccine trial in the past, 8 (or 67%) reported that they would be interested in receiving Q-
Pan H5N1 vaccine.
Of the persons who replied that they might be interested or they were not interested in the 
vaccine, the most common reasons were “I don’t think the vaccine would provide any 
further protection on top of my current safety practices” (61%), followed by “I have 
concerns about the safety of the adjuvant in the vaccine” (26%) (Table 3). In addition to Q-
Pan H5N1 vaccine, 69 of 90 respondents (77%) answered that they would be interested in 
vaccines against other HPAI viruses if they were licensed by FDA and available. Eighty-six 
of 91 respondents (95%) reporting having an occupational health clinic at their place of 
work and 73 of those (85%) had received any vaccine at this clinic previously.
4. Discussion
In our survey of laboratorians working with HPAI viruses, A (H5N1) was the most 
commonly used virus. Multiple different A (H5N1) virus strains were used by respondents 
and one third worked with A/Indonesia/05/2005, the strain included in the Q-Pan H5N1 
vaccine. Respondents spent an average of 5.1–11.7 h per week working in a BSL-3E area 
where HPAI experiments occur, with the most time spent working with specimens from 
suspected HPAI cases. Half of respondents were interested in receiving the Q-Pan H5N1 
vaccine, and another 38% wanted more information. Reasons given for lack of interest in the 
vaccine related to belief that the vaccine would not provide additional benefit on top of 
current safety practices and safety concerns about the adjuvant.
We found that among our respondents, students were among those with the most time spent 
working with HPAI viruses, including working with live virus, samples from suspect cases, 
and inoculated animals. In general, laboratory-acquired infections associated with any work 
in BSL-3 or 4 laboratories are rare [19,20]. Information about occupational categories or 
years of experience in advanced biosafety laboratories are not usually reported, but at least 
one student is known to have been infected with SARS coronavirus in the laboratory [21]. 
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Student respondents in our survey also had the highest interest in receiving the Q-Pan H5N1 
vaccine. However, we had few student respondents and those who worked more closely with 
HPAI viruses may have been more likely to complete the survey. Although this could 
introduce response bias, we would expect this same bias to occur across each occupational 
category.
Nearly half of respondents were interested in receiving the Q-Pan H5N1 vaccine and of the 
remaining, the majority responded that they might be interested but wanted more 
information. If vaccine were to be offered to laboratory workers, education should be 
provided about protection provided by the vaccine and its safety profile. The majority of 
respondents were also interested in receiving vaccines against other HPAI viruses if 
available and licensed. The most commonly selected reason for a lack of interest in Q-Pan 
H5N1 vaccine or wanting more information about the vaccine was a belief that the vaccine 
would not provide further benefit to current biosafety practices. If an A(H5N1) vaccine were 
to be recommended, it would be used in tandem with current laboratory training and 
biosafety practices and, in the event of an accident, recommended post-exposure prophylaxis 
with anti-viral medication [22–25].
Safety concerns were also given as a reason for lack of interest in the Q-Pan H5N1 vaccine, 
and these mostly centered on the adjuvant. Q-Pan H5N1 was the first licensed influenza 
vaccine with adjuvant in the United States [26]. Adjuvants are used to increase the 
magnitude and breadth (e.g., production of cross-strain neutralizing antibodies) of the 
immune response to the vaccine, which is especially important for vaccines containing 
influenza strains for which little or no prior antibodies are present, such as novel influenza A 
viruses [27–29]. During the 2009 influenza pandemic, some AS03-adjuvanted monovalent 
influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccines were associated with an increased risk of narcolepsy in 
children and adolescents in some countries [30,31], though it is unknown whether this was 
related to the antigen, the adjuvant, some genetic susceptibility, or a combination of these 
factors. The acceptable safety profile of Q-Pan H5N1 was demonstrated in several studies 
prior to licensure and is comparable with seasonal influenza vaccines, though larger sample 
sizes are needed to assess for rare adverse events such as narcolepsy [29,32,33]. 
Furthermore, the ASO3 adjuvant used in Q-Pan H5N1 has been shown to have a better 
immune response than the MF59 adjuvant when used in an A (H7N9) vaccine [34].
An ideal vaccine candidate would provide at least some level of cross-protection across 
multiple H5 subtype strains (i.e., heterologous protection). Development of neutralizing 
antibodies against other clades was seen in some participants of Q-Pan H5N1 
immunogenicity trials [35,36]. Adjuvanted A(H5N1) vaccines have been found to prevent 
mortality from heterologous strains in mice models [37] and some studies have found cross-
reacting antibodies in humans after a booster with a heterologous vaccine (for example, 
receiving a first dose of an influenza A/Vietnam/04 vaccine followed by a booster dose of an 
A/Indonesia/05 vaccine resulting in antibody development to multiple strains) [38]. 
However, Q-Pan H5N1 vaccine would be offered with the main intent to protect primarily 
against the A/Indonesia/05 strain.
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The risk of laboratory-acquired influenza A(H5N1) virus infection is likely extremely low. A 
review of reported select agent laboratory-acquired infections reported to CDC between 
2004 and 2010 identified a total of 11, giving an estimated rate of 1.57 per 10,000 laboratory 
worker-years in the United States [20]. There have been no cases of laboratory-acquired 
HPAI virus infections reported to date; however, the risk of laboratory-acquired infection is 
not zero and A(H5N1) virus remains a moderate pandemic threat [10]. In addition to 
laboratory workers, avian influenza outbreak responders are also at increased risk of 
occupational exposure. There have been several serosurveys among poultry workers in Asia 
responding to A(H5N1) virus outbreaks in poultry, all of which have demonstrated low 
levels of seropositivity [39–41]. Vaccination may provide a safe addition to current biosafety 
practices for the relatively small population at increased risk of occupational exposure. 
Based on estimates presented to ACIP, approximately 6000 doses would be needed to 
provide 2 doses to an estimated 2500 laboratory personnel and 500 public health responders 
in the United States [18].
Our survey has several limitations. The estimated response rate was low and our findings 
may not be representative of U.S. laboratory personnel working with HPAI viruses. In 
addition, our survey results may not be generalizable to other occupations with potential 
occupational exposure to HPAI viruses (e.g., avian influenza outbreak responders). We also 
had difficulties assessing accurately the time spent working with HPAI or A(H5N1) viruses. 
Estimates were based on respondents’ reported typical work schedules, which may vary in 
time spent in the BSL-3E area working with HPAI. Individuals who work more with HPAI 
or influenza A (H5N1) viruses may have been more likely to respond to the survey 
introducing response bias. Finally, the survey was designed to collect information relevant 
for vaccination policy in the United States and distributed to laboratories registered with the 
USDA, so the results may not be generalizable to the broader global community.
5. Conclusion
The majority of respondents were interested in or wanted more information about the Q-Pan 
H5N1 vaccine. HPAI vaccination of laboratory workers at risk of occupational exposure 
could be used along with existing biosafety practices to protect this population. If other 
HPAI vaccines are available and licensed, further research will be needed to determine 
which, if any, should be offered to HPAI laboratory workers during the inter-pandemic 
period.
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Fig. 1. 
Number of respondents and response rate by primary occupational category. *Students 
include graduate or other students, †Animal care includes husbandry or veterinary 
practices, §Other includes biosafety program staff or laboratory management.
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Fig. 2. 
Interest in Q-Pan H5N1 vaccine by occupational category among respondents who report 
working in a biosafety level 3 enhanced (BSL-3E) area where HPAI experiments 
occur. *Students include graduate or undergraduate students, †Animal care includes 
husbandry or veterinary practices, §Other includes biosafety program staff and management.
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Fig. 3. 
Interest in Q-Pan H5N1 vaccine by percentage of time spent working in the biosafety level 3 
enhanced (BSL-3E) laboratory among respondents who report working in a BSL-3E area 
where HPAI experiments occur.
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Table 1
Descriptive characteristics of survey respondents who reported any work in a biosafety level 3 enhanced 
(BSL-3E) area where experiments with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses occur (n = 100).
Characteristics
Primary Role (n = 100) n (%)
 Principal investigator 26 25%
 Research scientist 21 21%
 Post-doc 10 10%
 Research technician 20 20%
 Student (graduate or other) 6 6%
 Animal care (veterinary or husbandry practices) 1 1.0%
 Other (i.e., biosafety program staff, management) 16 16%
Place of work (n = 87) n (%)
 Academic/university 43 49%
 Manufacturer/industry 3 3.4%
 Federal government 30 34%
 Non-profit 5 5.7%
 Othera 6 6.9%
Sex (n = 99) n (%)
 Female 52 53%
Age (n = 99) n (%)
 <45 years 62 63%
 ≥45 years 37 37%
Work history (n = 96) median (Q1, Q3)
 Years working in a biosafety level 3 enhanced laboratory (BSL-3E) 8 (3, 12)
 Years working in a BSL-3E laboratory with HPAI 6 (2.75, 10)
aOther includes biomedical research, research hospital, and contract research organizations.
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